Explanations of the genuine openness of the future often appeal to objective indeterminacy. According to the received view, such indeterminacy is indeterminacy of certain future-tensed state of affairs that presently obtain. We shall call this view the weak indeterminate present, to distinguish it from the view we will defend in this paper, which we dub the strong indeterminate present. According to our view, unsettledness of the future is grounded on the present indeterminacy of some present-tensed state of affairs. In order (...) for an indeterminate present-tensed state of affairs to explain the unsettledness of a future-tensed state of affairs, there has to be a connection between the two. We argue that this connection can only be provided if we look at the internal structure of the relevant state of affairs. Finally, we will suggest that the best background theory to explain the connection are the so-called spontaneous collapse models of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

It has been argued that quantum mechanics forces us to accept the existence of metaphysical, mind-independent indeterminacy. In this paper we provide an interpretation of the indeterminacy involved in the quantum phenomena in terms of a view that we call Plural Metaphysical Supervaluationism. According to it, quantum indeterminacy is captured in terms of an irreducibly plural relation between the actual world and various misrepresentations of it.

This is a review of Survey of the State of the Art in Human Language Technology, [editorial board: Ronald Cole (editor-in-chief), Joseph Mariani, Hans Uszkoreit, Annie Zaenen, Victor Zue], Cambridge University Press (Studies in Natural Language Processing) and Giardini Editori e Stampatori in Pisa (Linguistica Computazionale, volumes XII-XII1), managing editors: Giovanni Battista Varile and Antonio Zampolli, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

A partire dalle testimonianze epistolari ciceroniane, in Varrone accademico e menippeo sono esaminate le dinamiche filologiche, contingenti e psicologiche, sottese alla seconda edizione degli "Academica" a favore della maschera di Varrone. Il "Varro" di Cicerone è l’unica porzione di dialogo superstite riconducibile alla formazione e all’adesione filosofica di Varrone quanto a logica, etica e fisica. Il reatino sarebbe stato spinto a tentare personalmente l’impresa di una trattazione sistematica nel perduto "De philosophia" (di cui resta traccia in Agostino) solo dopo il (...) dono-pungolo ricevuto dall’amico-rivale. Il famoso elogio ciceroniano rivolto a Varrone è riletto alla luce dell’agonismo e dell’antagonismo non tanto filosofico quanto personale tra i due accademici, risolvendosi in una sostanziale "deminutio" del dedicatario e della sua produzione. Dal punto di vista del conduttore del dialogo, le Menippee, in cui Varrone si era esposto anche filosoficamente (in qualche frammento, perfino canzonando i filosofi) e in cui Menippo era stato imitato e non tradotto, avrebbero funto “ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum”. L’imitazione di un’imitazione, dunque. Tale venata allusione prelude anche all’ostile tradizione riguardante la fosca ombra di Menippo, il “cane senza coda”, caldeggiato e difeso da Varrone in una menippea dedicata alla dipartita sui generis del filosofo. Nelle "Eumenides", la menippea meglio conservata, è presente il frammento che riassume anfibolicamente la duplice facies della formazione varroniana: la "cana Veritas" sarebbe la bianca verità platonica, ma anche la mordace verità cinica, portata alle estreme conseguenze dal Diogene pazzo. La riflessione si conclude platonicamente focalizzandosi sull’istantaneamente del suddetto frammento attraverso il calco varroniano "de inproviso", che rimanda anche alla Lettera VII e alle dottrine non scritte di Platone. -/- . (shrink)

Aim of the paper is to analyze Priest’s dialetheic solution to Curry’s paradox. It has been shown that a solution refuting ABS, accepting MPP and consequently refuting CP meets some difficulties. Here I just concentrate on one difficulty: one obtains the validity of MPP just using FA in the metalanguage, an invalid rule for a dialetheist.

I provide a simple solution to the problem of determining the characterising feature(s) of the simple approach to personal identity, sometimes also called the simple view: instead of focusing on claims regarding the analysability, reducibility, or triviality of the concepts used in simple theories of personal identity, I propose instead a metaphysical criterion to define this approach. In particular, I claim that the simple approach is (best seen as) that family of theories according to which personal identity is a relation (...) that essentially depends on a mereologically simple (or impartite) entity the existence and features of which may be known directly (e.g., by introspection) or indirectly (e.g., by deduction from a series of other premises). (shrink)